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ABSTRACT
NSEC5 is proposed modification to DNSSEC that simultaneously
guarantees two security properties: (1) privacy against offline zone
enumeration, and (2) integrity of zone contents, even if an adversary
compromises the authoritative nameserver responsible for respond-
ing to DNS queries for the zone. This paper redesigns NSEC5 to
make it both practical and performant. Our NSEC5 redesign fea-
tures a new fast verifiable random function (VRF) based on elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC), along with a cryptographic proof of its
security. This VRF is also of independent interest, as it is being stan-
dardized by the IETF and being used by several other projects. We
show how to integrate NSEC5 using our ECC-based VRF into the
DNSSEC protocol, leveraging precomputation to improve perfor-
mance and DNS protocol-level optimizations to shorten responses.
Next, we present the first full-fledged implementation of NSEC5—
extending widely-used DNS software to present a nameserver and
recursive resolver that support NSEC5—and evaluate their perfor-
mance under aggressive DNS query loads. Our performance results
indicate that our redesigned NSEC5 can be viable even for high-
throughput scenarios.
KEYWORDS
DNSSEC, verifiable random functions, elliptic curve cryptography,
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name Security Extensions (DNSSEC) uses asymmetric
cryptography to protect the integrity and authenticity of DNS re-
sponses. NSEC5 [48] is a new proposal for providing authenticated
denial of existence for DNSSEC, i.e., for responding to DNS queries
(“What is the IP address of aWa2j3.com?”) for names that do not
exist in a zone (“NXDOMAIN: aWa2j3.com does not exist in the
.com zone.”) NSEC5 has two key security properties.
First, NSEC5 provides strong integrity, protecting the integrity of
the zone contents even if an adversary compromises the authorita-
tive nameserver (who is responsible for responding to DNS queries
for the zone). Hardening the DNS against external compromise
seems to be an increasingly important security goal [71], especially
in light of recent attacks [1, 2, 4, 39, 53].
Second, NSEC5 provides privacy against offline zone enumera-
tion [16, 24, 28, 60, 67, 70, 84, 85, 87], where an adversary makes
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a small number of online DNS queries and then processes them
offline in order to learn all the domain names in a zone. Zone enu-
meration can be used to identify routers, servers or other ‘things’
(thermostats, fridges, baby monitors, etc.) that could then be tar-
geted in more complex attacks. An enumerated zone can also be
“a source of probable e-mail addresses for spam, or as a key for
multiple WHOIS queries to reveal registrant data that many reg-
istries may have legal obligations to protect” [60] (e.g., per EU data
protection laws [75],[19, pg. 37]). Several publicly available net-
work reconnaissance tools can be used to launch zone-enumeration
attacks [10, 16, 28, 67, 70, 84].
While today’s DNSSEC protocol has several mechanisms for
authenticated denial of existence, they all either fail to provide
integrity against a compromised nameserver (i.e., online signing
used in NSEC3White Lies [44] andMinimally-Covering NSEC [86]),
or fail to prevent offline zone enumeration (NSEC [20], NSEC3 [60]).
In fact, offline zone enumeration is an issue introduced by DNSSEC,
and is not a possible attack on legacy DNS.
The original NSEC5. NSEC5 was first proposed in [48]. This first
proposal, which lacked a full specification and implementation, was
met with some skepticism [47, 82].
The first issue is that when DNSSEC uses schemes that do not
prevent offline zone enumeration, then DNSSEC responses can be
precomputed. By contrast, NSEC5 requires an online asymmetric
cryptographic computation at the nameserver, in response to every
negative DNSSEC query. (This is necessary. As shown in [48], online
cryptography is necessary for any scheme that both (a) provides
integrity, and (b) prevents zone enumeration.) Thus, there was a
concern that NSEC5 would not be sufficiently performant.
The second issue is the length of DNSSEC responses. DNSSEC
naturally amplifies DNS responses by including cryptographic keys
and digital signatures. Several unfortunate things occur when long
DNSSEC responses no longer fit in a single IP packet [69, 70, 72].
Long responses sent over UDP can be fragmented across multiple
IP fragments, and thus risk being dropped by a middlebox that
blocks IP fragments [76, 80] or being subject to an IP fragmentation
attack [50]. Alternatively, the resolver can resend the query over
TCP [37, 65], harming performance (due to roundtrips needed to
establish a TCP connection) and availability (because some mid-
dleboxes block DNS over TCP) [76]. Worse yet, long DNSSEC re-
sponses can be used to amplify DDoS attacks [43]. In a DDoS ampli-
fication attack, a botnet sends nameservers many small DNS queries
that are spoofed to look like they come from a victim machine, and
the nameservers respond by pelting the victim machine with many
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long DNSSEC responses. Long DNSSEC responses increase the
volume of traffic that arrives at the victim.
The NSEC5 proposal in [48] was based on RSA, which exacer-
bated both concerns, because of the length of an RSA modulus and
the cost of an RSA exponentiation. Under the proposal, each NSEC5
response would contain up to three additional (long) RSA values
that had to be computed on-the-fly. Moreover, there is currently
serious discussion about replacing RSA, which is widely used in
DNSSEC deployments [18, 78], with elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) [52, 77, 81]; the goal is to have shorter responses at a better
security level. Thus, there was little enthusiasm for a new scheme
based on RSA.
In this paper, we implement and evaluate the NSEC5 proposal
from [48], and find that the concerns about its performance and
response lengths were justified.
A new version of NSEC5. In order to support the security goals
of NSEC5 without incurring the costs of the original RSA-based
NSEC5 proposal, we set out to design a new version of NSEC5. Our
approach proceeds along two lines.
First, we introduce DNS-level optimizations (Section 5) that allow
us to (1) precompute parts of the response, and (2) reduce the
number of DNSSEC records in the response.
Second, we redesign the cryptography behind NSEC5 (Section 4),
introducing a scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
To maintain the security properties of NSEC5, we cannot just
replace RSA with ECDSA. (Why? See Section 4.2.) Instead, the
starting point for our work is the observation of [66] that NSEC5
can be generically constructed from a verifiable random function
(VRF) [63]. A VRF is the public-key version of a keyed cryptographic
hash. We construct a VRF based on ECC, and prove its security
in the random oracle model. While our ECC VRF is similar to a
construction implicit in [41], this earlier work both lacked a proof
of security, and failed to satisfy the VRF security properties due
to a critical design flaw (that has been corrected as a result of our
work [7, 8, 40]). Beyond this, we take special care to minimize the
length of our VRF’s outputs while still maintaining security. Our
VRF has been submitted for standardization at the IETF [49].
Implementation. Our new version of NSEC5 has been submitted
for standardization at the IETF [83]. To evaluate our new version
of NSEC5, we present a full implementation of an authoritative
nameserver and recursive resolver that support both RSA- and ECC-
based NSEC5 (Section 6). (For the nameserver implementation, we
extend the Knot DNS 1.6 [12]. For the recursive resolver, we extend
Unbound 1.5.9.)
Performance results. Even though NSEC5 necessarily requires
the nameserver to perform online cryptographic computations,
we find that our new ECC-based NSEC5 can be viable even for
high-throughput scenarios. Throughput at our authoritative name-
server easily scales to a few tens of thousands of queries per second
(64K query/second) on a moderately-sized multi-core server (i.e.,
24 threads on 40 virtual cores). This is an order of magnitude larger
than the average negative response rate at single server in the
DNS’s root zone [6]. In fact, our ECC-based NSEC5 nameserver
implementation achieves a throughput that is about 2x higher than
the only nameserver implementation that prevents offline zone enu-
meration, is widely deployed, and is compliant with the DNSSEC
standards (i.e., PowerDNS’s implementation of online signing via
NSEC3White Lies [17]). Also, the performance of our NSEC5-ready
recursive resolver is comparable to DNSSEC’s existing denial-of-
existence mechanisms.
Response lengths. We show (Section 7.1) that our ECC-based
NSEC5 responses fit into a single IP packet, and have lengths that
are comparable to ECC versions of the current DNSSEC protocol
(i.e., NSEC3 with ECDSA signatures). In fact, ECC-based NSEC5
produces NXDOMAIN responses that are shorter than those pro-
duced by today’s dominant DNSSEC deployment configuration (i.e.,
NSEC3 with 1024-bit RSA signatures [18, 78]), which has a lower
security level!
Considering the transition to NSEC5. We conclude (Section 9)
by discussingmechanisms for transitioningNSEC5 into theDNSSEC
protocol. Given that the adoption of new cryptographic algorithms
into DNSSEC may be on the horizon (e.g., digital signatures over
Edwards elliptic curves [77, 88]), now may also be a good time to
consider the transition to NSEC5.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
• We present a VRF based on elliptic curves, prove its security in
the random oracle model, and use it to design a more performant
version of NSEC5 (Section 4, Appendix B).
• We design the DNS protocol surrounding NSEC5, using precom-
putation and other optimizations to improve performance and
shorten response lengths (Section 5).
• We present the first full-fledged implementation of both RSA-
and ECC-based NSEC5 for both an authoritative nameserver
and a recursive resolver. Our evaluation highlights significant
improvements in throughput and response size achieved by our
new ECC-based NSEC5 (Section 6,7).
• We discuss challenges and opportunities for adopting NSEC5 in
practice (Section 9).
2 TRADEOFFS IN TODAY’S DNSSEC
We start by reviewing the issues that lead to the development
of NSEC5 for DNSSEC. (See e.g., [87] for a historical overview
of the full DNSSEC protocol.) With DNSSEC, a trustworthy zone
owner is trusted to determine the set of names (www.example.com)
present in the zone and their mapping to corresponding values
(172.18.216.34). Nameservers receive information from the zone
owner, and respond to DNS queries for the zone made by resolvers.
DNSSEC’s schemes for authenticated denial of existence reflect
tradeoffs between integrity and privacy against offline zone enu-
meration. We describe each scheme and its tradeoffs below:
NSEC (RFC 4034 [20]). The NSEC record is defined as follows.
The trusted owner of the zone prepares a lexicographic order-
ing of the names present in a zone, and uses the private zone
signing key (ZSK) to sign a record containing each consecutive
pair of names. The precomputed NSEC records are then provided
to the nameserver. Then, to prove the non-existence of a name
(x.example.com), the nameserver returns the NSEC record cor-
responding to the pair of existent names that are lexicographi-
cally before and after the non-existent name (w.example.com and
z.example.com), with its associated DNSSEC signatures.
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NSEC provides strong integrity—it not only protects against
network attackers that intercept and attempt to alter DNSSEC re-
sponses, but is also robust to amalicious nameserver. This is because
NSEC records are precomputed and signed by the trusted owner
of the zone, and so the nameserver does not need to know the
private ZSK in order to produce a valid NSEC record. Without the
private ZSK, a malicious nameserver cannot sign bogus DNSSEC
responses.
On the other hand, NSEC is vulnerable to trivial zone enumera-
tion attacks: N online queries to the nameserver suffice to enumer-
ate all N names in the zone. Several network reconnaissance tools
use NSEC records to enumerate DNS zones [10, 14, 67, 70].
NSEC3 (RFC 5155 [60]). NSEC3 is meant to raise the bar for
zone enumeration attacks. The trusted owner of the zone crypto-
graphically hashes all the names present in the zone using SHA1,
lexicographically orders all the hash values, and uses the private
ZSK to sign a NSEC3 record containing every consecutive pair of
hashes. To prove the non-existence of a name, the nameserver re-
turns the precomputed NSEC3 record (and the associated DNSSEC
signatures) for the pair of hashes lexicographically before and after
the hash of the non-existent name.
When NSEC3 records are precomputed, it also provides strong
integrity. However, [28, 85] demonstrated (and RFC 5155 [60, Sec.
12.1.1] acknowledged) that hashing does not eliminate zone enu-
meration. To enumerate a zone that uses NSEC3, the adversary
again makes a number of online queries to the nameserver to col-
lect all the NSEC3 records, and then uses an offline dictionary attack
to crack the hash values in the NSEC3 records, thus learning the
names present in the zone. These offline attacks will only become
faster as new tools come online [14, 16, 84] and technologies for
fast hashing continue to improve (e.g., GPUs [85], ASICs).
Online signing with NSEC3White Lies (RFC 7129 [44]). Nei-
ther NSEC nor NSEC3 prevent zone enumeration. As a result, the
DNS community introduced a radically different approach that
prevented zone enumeration at the cost of sacrificing strong in-
tegrity. DNSSEC online signing requires the nameserver to hold the
secret zone-signing key (ZSK), and to use it to generate NSEC3 re-
sponses on the fly. Crucially, online signing does not provide strong
integrity—it protects only against network attackers that intercept
DNSSEC responses, but integrity is totally lost if the nameserver is
compromised, because the nameserver holds the secret ZSK that
can be used to sign bogus DNSSEC responses. We call this weak
integrity.
RFC 7129 [44] describes an online signing approach called “NSEC3
White Lies” which is supported by at least one major nameserver
implementation (PowerDNS). NSEC3White Lies requires the name-
server to use the secret ZSK to generate, on the fly, an NSEC3 record
that covers a query with the minimal pair of hash values.1 That is,
given a query α and its hash value h(α ), the nameserver generates
an NSEC3 record containing the pair of hashes (h(α ) − 1,h(α ) + 1),
and signs the NSEC3 record with the private ZSK. Because the
NSEC3 record only contains information about the queried name α ,
but not any name present in the zone, it provides privacy against
zone enumeration. Offline zone enumeration attacks no longer
work. Instead, enumeration is only possible by brute force—sending
no online weak strong
crypto integrity integrity privacy
legacy DNS ✓ X X ✓
(plain) NSEC or (plain) NSEC3 ✓ ✓ ✓ X
online signing, e.g. NSEC3 White Lies X ✓ X ✓
NSEC5 X ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: Properties of NSEC*. Note that [48] proved that it is
impossible to provide both privacy and weak integrity with-
out online crypto.
an online query to the nameserver for each name that is suspected
to be in the zone.
NSEC3 White Lies also has a helpful backwards-compatiblity
property for resolvers: resolvers just need to validate the NSEC3
record, but do not need to know or care whether the server is doing
online signing (with NSEC3 White Lies) or not (with plain NSEC3).
3 SECURITY PROPERTIES OF NSEC5
NSEC5 was introduced in [48, 66], to provide both privacy against
zone enumeration and strong integrity. NSEC5 is very similar to
NSEC3, except that we replace the cryptographic hashes used in
NSEC3 with the hashes computed by a verifiable random function
(VRF) [63]. Table 1 summarizes properties of NSEC5.We now review
the security properties of NSEC5, and revisit the exposition in [66]
to show how NSEC5 can be generically constructed from a VRF.
3.1 Verifiable Random Functions (VRF).
A VRF [63] is essentially the public-key version of a keyed crypto-
graphic hash. A VRF comes with a public-key pair (PK, SK ). Only
the holder of the private key SK can compute the hash, but anyone
with public key PK can verify the hash. A VRF hashes an input α
using the private key SK
β = FSK (α ) .
The collision-resistance guarantee of a VRF is similar to that of
a cryptographic hash function. The pseudorandomness of a VRF
guarantees that β is indistinguishable from random by anyone who
does not know the private key SK . The private key SK is also used
to construct a proof π that β is the correct hash output
π = ΠSK (α ) .
The proof π is constructed in such a way that anyone holding the
public key can validate that indeed β = FSK (α ). Finally, the VRF has
a trusted uniqueness property that roughly requires that, given
the VRF public key PK , each VRF input α corresponds to a unique
VRF hash output β . More precisely, trusted uniqueness guarantees
that, given a validly-generated PK , even an adversary that knows
SK cannot produce a valid proof for a fake VRF hash output β ′ , β .
(The word “trusted” here is used to indicate that we trust the key
generation process, and are not concerned with uniqueness for
untrusted keys.) See Appendix B for formal definitions.
All the VRFs we consider in this paper allow β to be computed
directly from π by a simple operation, i.e., hashing. This reduces
communication, since communicating π alone (without β) suffices.
1RFC4470 [86] also proposes “Minimally Covering NSEC Records” an analogous on-
line signing approach that uses NSEC records instead of NSEC3 records. We omit
further discussion of this approach because it is not supported by major nameserver
implementations (i.e., BIND, PowerDNS, Microsoft DNS, Knot DNS, etc.).
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3.2 NSEC5 from VRFs.
NSEC5 uses a VRF to provide authenticated denial of existence for
DNSSEC [66, Sec. 7]. We review the NSEC5 construction and three
new types of DNSSEC records it requires: NSEC5, NSEC5KEY and
NSEC5PROOF.
The NSEC5KEY. NSEC5 uses a VRF with its own keys. These
keys are distinct from the zone-signing key (ZSK) that computes
DNSSEC signatures. The private VRF key is known to both the
nameserver and the trusted owner of the zone. Meanwhile, the
private ZSK is only known to the trusted owner of the zone. Finally,
resolvers get the public ZSK (in a DNSKEY record), and the public
VRF key (in an NSEC5KEY record) using the standard mechanisms
used for DNSSEC key distribution.
Why do we need two separate keys, namely the ZSK (for sign-
ing DNS records) and the VRF key (for NSEC5)? This allows us to
separate our two security goals (i.e., strong integrity and privacy
against zone enumeration). To achieve strong integrity, we follow
the approach in NSEC and NSEC3, and provide the private ZSK to
the the trusted zone owner but not to the untrusted nameserver.
On the other hand, any reasonable definition of privacy against
zone enumeration must trust the nameserver; after all, the name-
server holds all the DNS records for the zone, and thus can trivially
enumerate the zone. For this reason, we will provide the secret
VRF key to the nameserver, and use the VRF only to deal with zone
enumeration attacks.
In [48], cryptographic lower bounds were used to prove the
nameserver must necessarily have some secret cryptographic key.
However, we shall soon see that NSEC5 still provides strong in-
tegrity even if the nameserver’s private key is compromised ormade
public—all that is lost is privacy against zone enumeration. This
is contrast to any online signing approach, such as NSEC3 White
Lies, where compromising the nameserver’s secret key eliminates
both integrity and privacy against zone enumeration (Table 2).
Precomputing NSEC5 records. The trusted zone owner uses
the private VRF key SK to compute the VRF hashes of all the names
present in the zone, lexicographically orders all the the hash val-
ues, and uses the private ZSK to sign a record containing every
consecutive pair of hashes; each pair of hashes is an NSEC5 record.
The precomputed NSEC5 records and their associated DNSSEC
signatures are provided to the nameserver along with the private
VRF key SK .
Responding with NSEC5 and NSEC5PROOFs. To prove the
non-existence of a queried name α , the nameserver uses the private
VRF key SK to obtain the VRF hash output β = FSK (α ) and the
proof value π = ΠSK (α ). The nameserver responds to the query
with
(1) an NSEC5PROOF record containing π , and2
(2) the precomputed NSEC5 record (and the associated DNSSEC
signatures) for the pair of hashes lexicographically before and
after β .
NSEC5 is almost identical to NSEC3, except that NSEC3 does not
have a ‘PROOF’ record because resolvers can hash α by themselves.
2We use VRFs where β can be publicly computable from the proof π , so do not include
β in the NSEC5PROOF record. VRFs that do not have this property additionally require
β to be included in the NSEC5PROOF.
integrity privacy
Online signing X X
NSEC5 ✓ X
Table 2: Comparing online signing (e.g., NSEC3 White Lies)
to NSEC5 when the nameserver is compromised.
(This is exactly why NSEC3 is vulnerable to offline zone enumera-
tion: because its hash function is publicly computable!)
Validating. The resolver validates the response by
(1) using the public VRF key in the NSEC5KEY record to validate
that proof π from the NSEC5PROOF corresponds to the query
α ,
(2) using a simple operation (i.e., hashing) to get β from π and then
checking that β falls between the two hash values in the NSEC5
record, and
(3) using the public ZSK to validate the DNSSEC signatures on the
NSEC5 record.
3.3 Properties of NSEC5.
Table 1 summarizes the properties of NSEC5.
Online crypto. NSEC5 requires online cryptographic computa-
tions for negative responses. (But not for positive responses.) For
every query α that elicits a negative response, the nameserver uses
the secret VRF key SK to compute the NSEC5PROOF record on
the fly. Notice that online signing (e.g., ‘NSEC3 White Lies’, see
Section 2) also requires online cryptographic computations. The
fact that both of these solutions prevent zone enumeration is not a
coincidence: [48] proved that any solution that both (a) prevents
zone enumeration and (b) provides weak integrity, must necessarily
use online cryptography. What is interesting about NSEC5 is that
it provides strong integrity (i.e., integrity even when the name-
server is malicious or compromised). Meanwhile, online signing
provides only weak integrity (i.e., against network attackers but
not compromised nameservers). See Tables 1-2.
Privacy. An attacker can only enumerate the zone by brute force—
by sending an online query to the nameserver for each name α that
it suspects is in the zone.
To see why, suppose an adversary has collected all the NSEC5
records for the zone, and nowwants to enumerate the zone using an
offline-dictionary attack that ‘cracks’ the VRF hashes. The adversary
must first hash each entry in his dictionary, and then check if any of
the hashed dictionary entries match any VRF hashes in the collected
NSEC5 records; if there is a match, the adversary has successfully
cracked the VRF hash. However, because the adversary does not
know the private VRF key, the VRF hash values are indistinguishable
from random values. It follows that the adversary cannot hash any
of the entries in its dictionary, and thus cannot perform a offline
dictionary attack. A formal security proof of this property is in [66].
Strong integrity. Strong integrity is provided even even if a
malicious nameserver, or any other adversary, knows the secret
VRF key SK . This is because because the untrusted nameserver does
not know the secret zone-signing key (ZSK). The idea behind the
formal proof (see [66]) of this property is simple. Suppose that the
secret VRF key SK used with NSEC5 is made public. Resolvers know
the correct public VRF key PK , so the VRF’s trusted uniqueness
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Keys. Let N be a public RSA modulus, let d be a secret RSA expo-
nent and e be its corresponding public exponent. The public VRF
key is (e,N ) and the secret VRF key is (d,N ).
Hashing. To hash input α using the private RSA key (d,N ), start
by computing the proof value
π = (MGF (α ))d mod N
and then compute the hash value β as
β = H (π )
H is a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-256) while MGF is
an IETF-standard cryptographic hash that produces outputs one bit
shorter than the RSA modulus [22, Sec. 10.2] (aka, a “full domain
hash” [25]). Notice that anyone can compute β given π .
Verifying. To verify that β is the VRF hash of α , first verify that
H (π ) = β and then use the public RSA key (e,N ) to verify that π is
a valid RSA signature onMGF (α ), i.e., that πe = MGF (α ) mod N .
Figure 1: VRF based on RSA. Appendix C proves its security
in the random oracle model.
ensures that an adversary (that knows SK) cannot trick resolvers
into accepting an incorrect VRF hash output.3 Then, NSEC5 is
essentially the same as (plain) NSEC3: the adversary can correctly
hash queries on its own, but cannot forge NSEC* records. Thus,
for any name α that is present in the zone, the adversary cannot
forge an NSEC5 record that falsely claims that α is absent from the
zone. In other words, even if the private NSEC5KEY is leaked to an
adversary, the security of NSEC5 just downgrades to that of (plain)
NSEC3. (See Tables 1-2.)
4 REDESIGNING THE CRYPTO
As discussed in Section 1, a key problem with the original NSEC5
construction from [48] was that it was based on RSA. We first
review [48]’s NSEC5 construction and explain why it implicitly
contains an RSA-based VRF; we prove the security of this RSA-
based VRF in Appendix C. We then explain why we cannot improve
its performance by just swapping out the RSA signatures in [48]
and replacing them with ECDSA. Finally, we construct a ECC-based
VRF, and prove its security in Appendix B.
4.1 VRF based on RSA
The original NSEC5 construction [48] was not described in terms of
VRFs. However, it actually uses the VRF in Figure 1, which is based
on RSA in the random oracle model. Notice that the VRF proof is
simply a deterministic RSA signature (using [25]’s “full-domain
hash" construction), and the VRF output is simply the cryptographic
hash of the VRF proof. VRF verification amounts to an RSA ver-
ification of the VRF proof. We prove that this is a secure VRF in
Appendix C.
Use with NSEC5. Each precomputed NSEC5 record contains two
SHA-256 hash outputs, each corresponding to β in Figure 1, and
one DNSSEC signature. Each NSEC5PROOF, generated on the fly,
has one RSA value (π in Figure 1).
Public parameters. Let q be a prime number, and let G a cyclic
group of prime order q with generator д. Because checking mem-
bership inG may be expensive, we assumeG is a subgroup of some
group E such that (1) checking membership in E is easy, and (2) the
cofactor f = |E |/|G | is not divisible by q. (G may equal E, in which
case f = 1.) We assume that q,д, f ,G and E are public parameters.
Let H1 be a hash function (modeled as a random oracle) mapping
arbitrary-length bitstrings onto G − {1}. Let H2 be a function that
takes the bitstring representation of an element of E and shortens it
to the appropriate length; we need a 2ℓ-bit output for ℓ-bit security.
Let H3 be a hash function (modeled as a random oracle) mapping
arbitrary-length inputs to an ℓ-bit integer.
Keys. The secret VRF key x ∈ {1, . . . ,q − 1} is chosen uniformly
at random. The public VRF key is PK = дx .
Hashing. Given the secret VRF key x and input α , compute the
proof π as follows:
(1) Obtain the group element h = H1 (α ) and raise it to the power
of the secret key to get γ = hx .
(2) Choose a random nonce k ∈ {0, . . . ,q − 1}.
(3) Compute c = H3 (д,h,дx ,hx ,дk ,hk ).
(4) Let s = k − cx mod q.
The proof π is the group element γ and the two exponent values c, s .
(Note that c may be shorter than a full-length exponent, because
its length is determined by the choice of H3). The VRF output
β = FSK (α ) is computed by shortening γ f with H2. Thus
π = (γ , c, s ) β = H2 (γ
f )
Notice that anyone can compute β given π .
Verifying. Given public key PK , verify that proof π = (γ , c, s )
corresponds to the input α and output β as follows:
(1) Compute u = (PK )c · дs .
(Note: if everything is correct then u = дk .)
(2) Given input α , hash it to obtain h = H1 (α ).
Check that γ ∈ E.
Compute v = (γ )c · hs .
(Note: if everything is correct then v = hk .)
(3) Check that hashing all these values together gives us c from
the proof. That is, check that:
c = H3 (д,h, PK ,γ ,u,v )
Finally, compute β = H2 (γ f ).
Figure 2: A VRF that operates in a cyclic group G of prime
order with generator д. We use a multiplicative group nota-
tion. This VRF adapts the Chaum-Pederson protocol [35] for
proving that two cyclic group elements дx and hx have the
same discrete logarithm x base д and h, respectively. Appen-
dix B proves its security in the random oracle model, based
on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, which
roughly says that hx looks random given the tuple (д,дx ,h).
4.2 Why can’t we just use ECDSA?
At this point, one would naturally wonder whywe don’t just replace
the RSA signature in Figure 1 with an ECDSA signature. After all,
ECDSA signatures are much shorter than RSA signatures at the
5
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same security level. (For instance, ECDSA signatures over 256-bit
elliptic curves are just 512 bits long and are understood to have an
ℓ = 128-bit security level, comparable to 3072-bit RSA.)
The problem is that while the “full-domain hash” RSA signature
used in Figure 1 is unique given the public key PK , an ECDSA
signature lacks this property. With randomized ECDSA signatures,
the signature is computed using a random nonce, and so signatures
are not unique given only the ECDSA public key PK . Moreover,
even “deterministic” ECDSA [73] fails to provide uniqueness given
only the ECDSA public key PK . With “deterministic” ECDSA, the
signer derives the signing nonce from a keyed hash of the message
it is signing, but the symmetric key k to this hash is independent
of the ECDSA public key PK . Thus, the signer could produce a
different ECDSA signature just by choosing a different key k , and
the verifier would never know the difference.
Why does this matter? If ECDSA signatures were used in the
construction of Figure 1, then the VRF prover could produce any
arbitrary number of valid VRF proofs π for a given input α and
public key PK . This clearly violates the trusted uniqueness property
of the VRF (Section 3.1). Per Section 3.3, trusted uniqueness is
central to the strong integrity property of NSEC5. This is why we
can’t base NSEC5 on ECDSA signatures.
4.3 VRF based on Elliptic Curves.
We now see how to produce shorter NSEC5 responses using elliptic
curves (ECC). Our starting point is construction of [41, 46]. We can-
not, however, we use [41]’s construction as is. While [41] claimed
their construction was also a VRF, they did not formally prove that it
achieves the VRF properties from Section 3.1. In fact, we discovered
that their construction (which has since been adopted by Google’s
Key Transparency project [11, 62]) has a critical flaw that allows a
malicious prover to violate the VRF’s trusted uniqueness property.
This flaw has since been corrected as a result of our work [7, 8, 40].
Our VRF construction can be seen in Figure 2 and our formal
proof of its security properties in Appendix B. It fixes the flaw
of [41], without any downgrade in performance. On the contrary,
since we provide a concrete (as opposed to asymptotic) security
analysis as per the formulation of [26], we can optimize the VRF’s
parameters. Concretely, we can shorten the length of VRF proof
π , by truncating value c in Figure 2 so that it is only ℓ bits long
(and not 2 · ℓ). This results in NSEC5PROOF records that are ℓ bits
shorter.
Our VRF can be instantiated over any group where the decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard, including the elliptic curves
currently standardized in DNSSEC (NIST P-256 [55, Sec. 3]), and
Curve25519 [59] which has recently been proposed for use with
DNSSEC [56, 77]. Each of these curves operates in finite field Fp
where p is a 256-bit prime, and achieves a security level of ℓ = 128
bits [27, 55].
Use with NSEC5. What response lengths do we get when we
instantiate NSEC5 with the VRF in Figure 2 over 256-bit elliptic
curves?
Each NSEC5 record will once again contain two hash outputs
(each corresponding to β in Figure 2) along with a DNSSEC signa-
ture. We instantiate H2 in Figure 2 with the function that outputs
example.com A
bar.example.com A
www.example.com A
*.www.example.com A
Figure 3: Example zone.
the x coordinate (abscissa) of a point (x ,y) on the elliptic curve
(where x ,y ∈ Fp ). Thus, each β will be 256-bits long.
We instantiate H1 per Appendix A.
Next, observe that each NSEC5PROOF record will contain the
proof value π = (γ , c, s ) from Figure 2. How long is π? If we in-
stantiate the VRF using a 256-bit elliptic curve (e.g., NIST P-256 or
Ed25519), then s is 256 bits long. Meanwhile, γ is a point on the
elliptic curve, which can be represented with 256 + 1 bits using
point compression.4 Finally, we show (in Appendix B) c must be
ℓ-bits long for an ℓ-bit security level. We therefore instantiate H3
as the first 128 bits output by the SHA-256 hash function.
It follows that proof π will be p = 256+ 1+ ℓ+ 256 = 513+ ℓ bits
for a ℓ-bit security level; thus, p = 641 for a 128-bit security level.
Achieving the same security level with RSA requires 3072-bit RSA,
which results in NSEC5PROOFS that are about 5 times longer!
5 DESIGNING THE DNS PROTOCOL FOR
NSEC5
To properly understand the performance of NSEC5, we must move
beyond the clean and idealized model we used thus far, where each
query (“What is the IP for example.com?”) elicits either a positive
response (“172.18.216.34.”) or a negative response (“NXDOMAIN:
The name does not exist.”) In practice, the behavior of NSEC* is
much messier. This is primarily due to the complex nature of a
seemingly-unrelated issue: DNS wildcards [60, Section 7.2.1],[45,
61]. (Indeed, the treatment of DNS wildcards is so complex that
RFC4592 [61] clarifying their use was issued nineteen years after
the original DNS RFC1035 [65].) Thus, we start by digging into how
NSEC3 handles wildcards. We then design the protocol that NSEC5
uses to deal with wildcards, and describe how it (1) uses a “wildcard
bit" to shorten response lengths and (2) exploits precomputation to
improve performance.
5.1 Wildcard and closest encloser proofs.
Awildcard record maps a set of queries to a particular response. For
example, if the domain has a wildcard record for *.example.com,
then queries for c.example.com and a.b.c.example.com would
all be answeredwith the value in thewildcard record (e.g., “172.18.216.35”).
To see why wildcards matter, we use a running example. Suppose
a DNS query for a.b.c.example.com is made to the example zone
in Figure 3. The correct response is NXDOMAIN (i.e., the name
4The idea behind point compression is to represent a point with coordinates (x, y )
using only its abscissa x (which is 256 bits long) and a single bit that indicates which
square root (positive or negative) should be used for the ordinate y . Without point
compression, both coordinates must be transmitted, for a total length of 256+256 bits.
(Thus, without point compression our proof π would be 2 ∗ 256 + 128 + 256 = 896
bits long.) There has been some controversy over whether or not point compression is
covered by a patent, and whether its use in DNSSEC corresponds to patent infringe-
ment [81]. However, as Bernstein [29] argues: “a patent cannot cover compression
mechanisms [appearing in the paper by Miller in 1986 [64] that was] published seven
years before the patent was filed.” Moreover, new IETF specifications for elliptic curve
digital signatures using Ed25519 also use point compression [56].
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does not exist). Why? First, example.com is the longest ancestor
of the queried name that exists in the zone. In DNS terminology,
example.com is the closest encloser for a.b.c.example.com [61].
Next, *.example.com—the wildcard child of the closest encloser—is
not in the zone. Thus, there is nowildcard expansion of a.b.c.example.com.
The correct response is NXDOMAIN.
But how can a nameserver use DNSSEC to securely prove the
absence of relevant wildcards? First, the nameserver must prove
that example.com is the closest encloser, by proving:
(1) The presence of the closest encloser example.com.
(2) The absence of the next closer c.example.com, the name one
label longer than the closest encloser.
(Notice that the next closer is sometimes identical to the queried
name, e.g., if we had instead queried for c.example.com.) Once this
is it done, the nameserver must additionally prove:
(1) The absence of *.example.com, the wildcard child of the clos-
est encloser.
5.2 NSEC3 and wildcards.
How does NSEC3 prove the three items above? The middle and last
item are easily dealt with, by providing the NSEC3 record proving
the absence of the name, i.e., that contains a pair of hashes h1,h2
such that h1 < h(name) < h2. But what about proving the presence
of a name (i.e., the first item)? One way to do this is to provide an
NSEC3 record that matches the name, i.e., that contains a pair of
hashes h1,h2 such that h1 = h(name). Thus NSEC3 proves the three
items by returning three NSEC3 records [60]:
(1) A NSEC3 record matching the closest encloser, i.e., an NSEC3
recordwith two hash valuesh1,h2 such thath1 = h(example.com).
(2) An NSEC3 record covering the next closer, i.e., an NSEC3 record
containing two hash valuesh1,h2 such thath1 < h(c.example.com) <
h2.
(3) An NSEC3 record covering the wildcard, i.e., an NSEC3 record
containing two hash valuesh1,h2 such thath1 < h(∗.example.com) <
h2.
Thus, wildcards significantly impact performance: a single query
can solicit up to three NSEC3 responses! (Figure 4.)Sometimes,
fewer than three NSEC3 records are needed. For instance, only two
records are needed if the same record matches h(example.com) and
coversh(c.example.com). Indeed, this is always true for NSEC, so at
most two NSEC records are returned for each query. We summarize
the impact on performance below and in Table 3.
Response length. Every query can elicit a response containing
(up to) three NSEC3 records, each of which includes as DNSSEC
signature (of length σ bits) and two hash values (each of length 2ℓ
bits). Thus, the bitlength of the response can be estimated as
|nsec3| = 3(4ℓ + σ ) = 12ℓ + 3σ (1)
Resolver computations. The resolver must verify up to three
DNSSEC signatures (on each NSEC3 record).
Nameserver computations. When regular NSEC3 is used, all
responses are precomputed. When NSEC3 White Lies is used, re-
sponses are generated on the fly, so up to three NSEC3 records are
signed in response to every query.
online crypto verifications max response
at nameserver at resolver length
NSEC none 2 RRSIGs 2σ
NSEC3 none 3 RRSIGs 3σ + 12ℓ
NSEC3 White Lies 1 RRSIG 3 RRSIGs 3σ + 12ℓ
NSEC5 1 NSEC5PROOF 2 RRSIGs 2σ + 8ℓ + 2p
2 NSEC5PROOFs
Table 3: Performance characteristics of NXDOMAIN re-
sponses for NSEC*. RRSIG records are DNSSEC signatures.
σ is the bitlength of a DNSSEC signature, 2ℓ is the bitlength
of the hash output in the NSEC3 or NSEC5 record, and p is
the bitlength of an NSEC5PROOF.
5.3 Adding the wildcard bit to NSEC5.
In [45], however, Gieben and Mekking observed that wildcards
could be dealt with just two NSEC3 records. Their proposal sim-
ply requires a wildcard bit to be added to each NSEC3 record. If
an NSEC3 record contains the pair of hashes h1,h2 where h1 =
h(example.com), then the wildcard bit is set if *.example.com is
present in the zone, and cleared otherwise. This simple trick al-
lows us to eliminate the third NSEC3 record! Instead, we need only
check that the wildcard bit is cleared on the first NSEC3 record.
The wildcard bit was not standardized as part of NSEC3, and has
not been deployed in practice [44]. However, we can use it with
NSEC5, because NSEC5 records have the same structure as NSEC3
records.
NSEC5 uses the wildcard bit, so that up to two NSEC5 records
(and two NSEC5PROOFs) are needed to respond to any query. (See
Figure 5.)This has significant impact on response lengths:
Response lengths. Every query can elicit a response containing
(up to) two NSEC5 records, each including a DNSSEC signature
(length σ bits) and two hash values (each of length 2ℓ bits), and
up to two NSEC5PROOF records (each of length p bits). We can
therefore estimate the total bitlength of the response as
|nsec5| = 2(4ℓ + σ + p) = 8ℓ + 2σ + 2p (2)
Resolver computations. Resolvers need to verify twoNSEC5PROOF
records and up to two DNSSEC signatures (on each NSEC5 record).
5.4 Adding precomputation to NSEC5.
Perhaps the biggest performance challenge with NSEC5 is the need
for the nameserver to perform online crypto. We now see how to
lower this burden on the nameserver.
First recall that all DNSSEC signatures on NSEC5 records must
be precomputed. (This is because NSEC5 records are signed by the
zone-signing key (ZSK). To preserve strong integrity, the name-
server must not know the secret ZSK.) It is also possible to precom-
pute one of the twoNSEC5PROOFs. Specifically, the first NSEC5PROOF
and NSEC5 record prove the presence of the closest encloser (i.e.,
example.com) are as follows: (1) The NSEC5 record has two hash
values h1,h2, where h1 is the VRF hash of the closest encloser, and
(2) the NSEC5PROOF has a proof π that h1 is a correct VRF hash
value. The NSEC5PROOF for h1 can therefore be precomputed and
cached at the same time as the NSEC5 record.Online crypto is only
needed for the second NSEC5PROOF. The second NSEC5PROOF
andNSEC5 record cover the next closer c.example.com. TheNSEC5PROOF
proves that β is a correct VRF hash of c.example.com. Meanwhile,
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the NSEC5 record has a pair of VRF hash outputs h1,h2 that must
fall lexicographically before and after β . Importantly, h1 and h2
must not equal β . Also, β is unknown at the time that the NSEC5
record is prepared. As such, the NSEC5PROOF for β cannot be
precomputed.
Thus NSEC5 only needs one online cryptographic computation
when the nameserver responds to a query.5
5.5 Other protocol considerations
NODATA Responses. Thus far, our exposition has used an ideal-
ized model where all DNS queries are of the same type: the query
contains a domain name (www.example.com), and the response con-
tains an IPv4 address (“172.18.216.34”). Actually, this is a query for
an A record. In practice, there are other query types. For instance,
the AAAA record is for IPv6 addresses. Suppose the example zone
in Figure 3 receives a AAAA query for www.example.com. The zone
has an A record for www.example.com, but not a AAAA one. Thus,
the correct response is NODATA, (i.e., “The name exists, but not
for queried type”).
Because NSEC5, NSEC3, and NSEC records all have the same
structure, they all deal with NODATA responses as follows. Every
NSEC* record includes a type bitmap [20, 60], containing a bit for
each type of DNS record (e.g., A, AAAA, NS, MX). Consider the
NSEC* record matching www.example.com, i.e., that contains a pair
of hash values h1,h2 such that h1 is the hash of www.example.com.
In our example zone, this NSEC* record has its type A bit set, and
its other type bits cleared. This NSEC* record would be used to
respond to an AAAA query for www.example.com. The resolver
would conclude the response is NODATA by checking that the the
AAAA bit cleared. Notice that NODATA responses always use just
one NSEC* record!
Privacy. Wildcards and types have minor implications on NSEC5
privacy. Consider a queried name (e.g., a.b.c.example.com) that
does not exist in the zone. Then, the NXDOMAIN response reveals
the closest encloser’s name (example.com) and types that exist in
the zone (e.g., A, AAAA, MX, NS), and also reveals if its wildcard
child (*.example.com) exists in the zone. Meanwhile, if a queried
name (e.g., www.example.com) does exist in the zone, then the NO-
DATA response reveals its all types (e.g.,A) present in the zone. This
means that NSEC5 ensures that an attacker can learn which types
of a non-wildcard name (example.com) exist in the zone only if it
(1) queries for the exact name (example.com) OR (2) queries for any
longer name that contains it as a prefix (e.g., a.b.c.example.com).
In other words, the attacker must still enumerate the zone by brute
force, sending an online query for every name (or longer name that
contains it as a prefix) suspected to be in the zone.
Key management. NSEC5KEY records can be distributed in
the same way as DNSKEY records. Menawhile, as discussed in
Section 3.3, the nameservermust store the private NSEC5 key (to the
VRF) but not the private ZSK. The secret NSEC5 key is not subject to
the same security requirements as a regular DNSSEC secret key (i.e.,
5As noted in Table 3, a similar precomputation approach is possible with NSEC3
White Lies. Specifically, the presence of the closest encloser example.com and the
presence/absence of its wildcard child *.example.com are known at the time that the
zone is signed. Therefore, their corresponding NSEC3 records can be precomputed.
This optimization is (sort of) performed by the PowerDNS nameserver, which caches
and reuses NSEC3 records generated on-the-fly for the closest encloser and wildcard.
ZSK). Why? Because the damage from a compromised NSEC5 key
is the same as the damage from a downloaded zone file; integrity is
not damaged. And an attacker who can break into a nameserver
to steal the NSEC5 key can probably also download the zone file,
anyway. Moreover, the NSEC5KEY can be rolled over using the
same procedure to roll a ZSK [58]: the new NSEC5KEY record is
published at the nameserver, then old NSEC5 records are replaced
by NSEC5 records computed using the new NSEC5KEY, and finally
the old NSEC5KEY is removed.
Opt-out. NSEC5 supports opt-out in the same way as NSEC3 [60].
6 FULL-FLEDGED NSEC5 IMPLEMENTATION
We designed and implemented the two NSEC5 variants (RSA and
ECC), extending existing DNS software. For the authoritative name-
server, we extended Knot DNS 1.6.4, a highly-optimized author-
itative implementation. For the recursive resolver we extended
Unbound 1.5.9, one of the most widely used recursive resolver im-
plementations. Our implementation supports the full spectrum of
negative responses, (i.e., NXDOMAIN, NODATA, Wildcard, Wild-
card NODATA, and unsigned delegation). The authoritative im-
plements the optimization that precomputes the NSEC5PROOFs
matching each NSEC5 record (Section 5.4). We did not introduce
additional library dependencies; all cryptographic primitives are
already present in OpenSSL v1.0.2j, which is used by both imple-
mentations. We implemented our elliptic-curve VRF for the NIST
P-256 curve. The code is deliberately modular, so that the Ed25519
curve [56] (which is not supported by OpenSSL v1.0.2j) could be
used a drop-in replacement. Overall, we added approximately 9,000
lines of C code. We plan to make the source publicly available.
A “live” example from our implementation. Figures 4 and 5
present “live” NXDOMAIN responses from our implementation,
for NSEC3 and NSEC5 respectively. (Cryptographic values (hashes,
proofs, and signatures) have been shortened and some data fields
have been dropped.) To generate these responses, we signed a small
example.com zone with NSEC3 using ECDSA-P256 (DNSSEC algo-
rithm 13) and ECC-based NSEC5. Per Section 5.2, NSEC3 returns
three records and their corresponding signatures. On the other
hand, the wildcard bit used with NSEC5 allows us to return only
two NSEC5 records and two NSEC5PROOFS (Section 5.4).
7 NSEC5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now evaluate the performance of NSEC5 and compare it against
(plain) NSEC3 and online signingwith NSEC3White Lies (Section 2).
We consider response length, query processing time at the recursive
resolver and nameserver, and throughput, memory and CPU usage
at the nameserver.
Configurations. We tested our Knot DNS nameserver implemen-
tation in four configurations:
(1) NSEC3 with 2048-bit RSA signatures (DNSSEC Algorithm 8),
(2) NSEC3 with ECDSA signatures over the NIST P-256 curve
(DNSSEC Algorithm 13),
(3) NSEC5 with 2048-bit RSA signatures (RRSIG) and NSECPROOF
records,
(4) NSEC5 with ECC using the NIST P-256 curve for both signa-
tures (RRSIG) and NSECPROOFs.
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$ kdig +dnssec +multiline ddadasds.example.com
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY; status: NXDOMAIN; id: 22793
;; Flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1; ANSWER: 0; AUTHORITY: 8; ADDITIONAL: 1
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;; ddadasds.example.com. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com.     3600 IN SOA dns1.example.com. 
example.com.     3600 IN RRSIG SOA 13 2 3600 20170128184611 
( 5134 example.com. nqiEgM+kVBDeBI== )
;; Matching record for hash of example.com –-closest encloser;
0sc7qshrek878fcmnag1.example.com. 3600 IN NSEC3 1 0 0 AABB     
( CPDHD7GK40NGDKRU8CQ8 NS SOA MX RRSIG DNSKEY NSEC3PARAM )
0sc7qshrek878fcmnag1.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC3 13 3 3600 
( 5134 example.com. 2JicIoTH3WkgAjbP/ehmTv== )
;; Covering record for hash of ddadasds.example.com –-next closer record;
jftj44t4kqppke20mukr.example.com. 3600 IN NSEC3 1 0 0 AABB   
( MSC7QSHREK878FCM8GD7 A AAAA RRSIG )
jftj44t4kqppke20mukr.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC3 13 3 3600
( 5134 example.com. VfFQfho5sQ8QVWOqsrXyN6== )
;; Covering record for hash of *.ddadasds.example.com –-wildcard record;
cpdhd7gk40ngdkru8cq8n.example.com. 3600 IN NSEC3 1 0 0 AABB 
( J1VSBFDBU38SMLNJPIMM A AAAA RRSIG )
cpdhd7gk40ngdkru8cq8n.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC3 13 3 3600
( 5134 example.com. lcDsoeVGuq3rvezN2oW74x== )
;; Received 773 B
Figure 4: NXDOMAIN response with NSEC3.
$ kdig +dnssec ddadasds.example.com
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY; status: NXDOMAIN; id: 18282
;; Flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1; ANSWER: 0; AUTHORITY: 8; ADDITIONAL: 1
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;; ddadasds.example.com. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com.    3600 IN SOA dns1.example.com. 
example.com.    3600 IN RRSIG SOA 16 2 3600 
( 5137 example.com. kVfd4pgDmWMg== )
;; Matching record for hash of example.com –-closest encloser; 
;; Wildcard flag is not set;
ec2i1k1adn16bb9sbh1k.example.com. 86400 IN NSEC5 48566 0 
( H4ETTRT2RNLVQA2DU6HM NS SOA MX RRSIG DNSKEY NSEC5KEY )
ec2i1k1adn16bb9sbh1k.example.com. 86400 IN RRSIG NSEC5 16 3 86400 
( 5137 example.com. RbkKnf4MT/Fg== )
;; Covering record for hash of ddadasds.example.com –-next closer record;
4vulla22dr6bo63j203c.example.com. 86400 IN NSEC5 48566 0 
( C341KKJADV09N1BH2DJ0 A AAAA RRSIG )
4vulla22dr6bo63j203c.example.com. 86400 IN RRSIG NSEC5 16 3 86400 
( 5137 example.com. KMrN9N+J9Rug== )
;; NSEC5PROOF records;
example.com.  3600 IN NSEC5PROOF 48566 ( AiZnaTPduKWyig )
ddadasds.example.com.  3600 IN NSEC5PROOF 48566 ( AzH6uKGjS+2FJf )
;; Received 834 B
Figure 5: NXDOMAIN response with NSEC5.
The NSEC3 configurations used 10 hash iterations. (This is a com-
mon choice in practice, e.g., at the .ru zone.) Finally, we used Pow-
erDNS6 4.0.1 in “narrow” mode with BIND back-end to evaluate
(5) NSEC3 White Lies with ECDSA signatures over NIST P-256
(DNSSEC Algorithm 13)
For the recursive resolver, we used our NSEC5-ready extension of
Unbound in validating and caching mode.
6We acknowledge that this is not an apples-to-apples comparison. But, to the best of
our knowledge, PowerDNS is the only widely-deployed open-source nameserver that
supports DNSSEC online signing in an RFC-compliant way. Meanwhile, we chose to
focus our NSEC5 implementation effort on the more performant Knot DNS nameserver.
System. All experiments were executed on a machine with 20X
Intel Xeon E5-2660 v3 cores with dual thread support for a total of 40
virtual CPUs, and 256GB RAM, running CentOS Linux 7.1.1503 and
OpenSSL 1.0.2j. We would expect a typical SLD to have multiple
nameservers of roughly this size, possibly at multiple locations.
Because network latency is a common denominator for all our
schemes, all experiments were performedwith this machine hosting
both the nameserver (using 24 threads) and the recursive resolver
(using up to 16 threads), each listening at a different port.
Stress testing with “purely negative” query loads. Unless
otherwise specified, our measurements use synthetic query loads.
We elicit negative (NXDOMAIN) responses by sending queries for
names from the zone prepended with a random six-alphanumeric-
character sequence. We deliberately chose to stress-test our im-
plementation using this aggressive “purely negative” query load.
Importantly, a purely negative query load would typically occur
only when a server is subject to a volumetric denial-of-service
attack; natural DNS traffic usually elicits both positive responses
(e.g., A, AAAA, MX, NS records) as well as negative ones (NXDO-
MAIN) [5].
Zone. We test against a real Alexa-100 second-level-domain (SLD)
zone that consists of about 1000 names.7 Note that our results are
largely agnostic to the choice of zone, because we use worst-case
query load of purely negative traffic, which eliminates the effect of
caching, and therefore the size of the zone itself has little impact
on performance. One notable exception is the RAM footprint at the
namesever, and so for this we give results for two zones.
7.1 Response lengths.
We want DNSSEC responses to be short enough to fit into a sin-
gle IP packet and to limit DDoS amplification (Section 1). We find
that NSEC5-ECC response lengths are comparable to NSEC3 with
ECDSA, and shorter than today’s dominant deployment configura-
tion (NSEC3 with 1024-bit RSA).
Figure 7. Figure 7 shows the average response size for 100,000 NX-
DOMAIN responses for our four Knot DNS configurations. When
RSA is used, both NSEC5 (at 1731 bytes, on average) and NSEC3
(1517 bytes) do not fit in a 1500-byte IP packet (Ethernet MTU).
Meanwhile, ECC-based NSEC5 is much shorter (827 bytes, on av-
erage), easily fitting into a single IP packet, and is comparable to
ECC-based NSEC3 (783 bytes).
Comparison to “legacy” NSEC3. Modern cryptographic rec-
ommendations mandate a security level of at least 112 bits [23].
Despite these recommendations, NSEC3 only supports (outdated)
SHA1 as its hash function [60], for an (outdated) security level of
ℓ = 80 bits. (NSEC5 records use a 2ℓ = 256-bit hash outputs, for a
ℓ = 128-bit security level.) Also, most domains deploying DNSSEC
still use 1024-bit RSA (σ = 1024 bits) [18, 78], for an (outdated)
80-bit security level [23]. NSEC3 with 1024-bit RSA has an aver-
age response length of 1069 bytes. This is about 29% longer than
ECC-based NSEC5, which also has a much stronger security level
(ℓ = 128 versus ℓ = 80 bits)!
7We used the only domain in the Alexa 100 that we could completely enumerate
because it used DNSSEC with NSEC records. (The rest were unsigned, or did not use
NSEC records, and thus could not be enumerated.)
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Figure 6: (Left) Query processing time at the authoritative nameserver per NXDOMAIN response. (Center) Throughput at the
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Figure 7: Average length for a single NXDOMAIN response
(standard deviation < 1%).
7.2 Nameserver performance.
Both NSEC5 and NSEC3 White Lies prevent offline zone enumer-
ation by requiring online public-key crypto computations at the
nameserver. (See Table 3.) We compare their performance at the
nameserver, and find that our ECC-based NSEC5 implementation
(extending Knot DNS) is faster than PowerDNS’s implementation
of NSEC3 White Lies.
Processing time per query. To measure the time it takes to pro-
cess a query at the authoritative, we ran 100,000 sequential queries,
each eliciting an NXDOMAIN response. To fairly compare across
implementations, we report round-trip time as observed by the
query issuer. Figure 6-(left) presents the results. Ignoring the tail
of the plot (which can be attributed to delays in inter-process com-
munication and other tasks running in the background), we see
that the majority of queries are processed consistently close to an
average time for each configuration. Plain NSEC3 (with RSA-2048
and ECDSA-P256) uses precomputed responses; as such, the name-
server can respond to queries in just 117µs and 116µs on average.
Meanwhile NSEC5 and NSEC3 White Lies use online crypto, there-
fore process queries more slowly. RSA-based NSEC5 takes 1.93ms
on average, while ECC-based NSEC5 presents a 2.3x speedup, for
an average query processing time of 0.81ms. This is faster than the
1.12ms query processing time for the PowerDNS implementation
of NSEC3 White Lies!8
Throughput with purely negative traffic. Next, we consider
aggregate query throughput. We used Dnsperf 2.1.1 [15], a popular
open-source DNS performance evaluation tool, to issue negative
queries at fixed rates from 1K to 128K queries per second (qps).
Figure 6-(center) presents throughput results on a logarithmic
scale.
Plain NSEC3 does not use online cryptographic computations,
and so throughput scales easily to 128 Kqps and beyond. The re-
maining schemes do use online crypto computations. RSA-based
NSEC5 plateaus earliest—the nameserver cannot cope with a query
rate greater than about 20 Kqps. Turning to elliptic-curve configu-
rations, PowerDNS’s NSEC3 White Lies plateaus at about 32 Kqps,
while our ECC-based NSEC5 improves on this to almost 64 Kqps.
This 2x improvement follows from differences in the Knot DNS and
PowerDNS implementations, which is also in line with benchmark
results of [13]. ([13] finds a 2-3x gap in throughput between the Knot
DNS and PowerDNS when serving DNSSEC-enabled zones.)Our
NSEC3-ECC throughput results should be well above the needs
of most zone operators. To put this in context, the A operator [6]
reports an average negative query load per server that is roughly
one order of magnitude smaller. (On July 7, 2017 the total number
of NXDOMAIN responses (RCODE 3) that day is 2640833191 split
across 5 servers for an average of 6113 q/second/server.)
Throughput with mixed traffic. In practice, throughput should
be even higher, because normal traffic should elicit positive re-
sponses (e.g., signed A records), which are precomputed, in ad-
dition to NXDOMAIN responses. To demonstrate this, we tested
ECC-based NSEC5 at a steady query rate of 32 Kqps using 4 (rather
than 24) threads. When fewer than 50% of responses are NXDO-
MAIN, throughput remains steady at 32 Kqps. Meanwhile, purely
NXDOMAIN traffic saturates throughput at 13 Kqps.
8Per footnote 5, PowerDNS caches and reuses NSEC3 records generated on-the-fly for
the closest encloser and wildcard. By contrast, our NSEC5 implementation precomputes
the closest-encloser records, rather than caching and reusing them. Thus, to fairly
compare across implementations, we crafted the query load so that all queries could
use the same records (served from cache) for all but the next-closer records (Section 5.1).
Therefore, both NSEC5-ECC and NSEC3 White Lies perform a single online crypto
computation at query time.
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Table 4: Memory footprint (MB) at the authoritative after
loading the zone.
CPU utilization. CPU utilization is shown in Figure 6-(right). We
used the Linux perf_events profiler to measure the task-clock
time per second (shown on the y-axis of Figure 6-(right)), which re-
ports the CPU time spent by a process across all threads. Since
we use 24 threads, full utilization would correspond to a task-
clock/second of 24. All measurements were taken over a 5 minute
period (time shown on the x-axis) with 32 Kqps query load of purely
NXDOMAIN traffic. From Figure 6-(center), we already know that
a 32 Kqps query load causes throughput to deteriorate for RSA-
based NSEC5 and PowerDNS’s NSEC3 White Lies, but not for plain
NSEC3 and ECC-based NSEC5. Considering the corresponding CPU
utilization in Figure 6-(right), we see that plain NSEC3 has the low-
est CPU utilization (roughly 50%, or task-clock time/second of
about 12) while NSEC3-ECC is not too much higher. Meanwhile,
NSEC3 White Lies (with PowerDNS) has the heaviest CPU utiliza-
tion (roughly 95%, or task-clock time/second of about 23), mostly
due to implementation differences between Knot DNS and Pow-
erDNS. As a final note, we expect utilization to be lower in a setting
tuned for maximum performance, since these results include the
heavy logging necessary for our experiments.
Memory footprint. Table 4 considers the memory footprint at
the authoritative nameserver, once the zone is loaded. Because our
test SLD zone had only 1000 records, we repeated this experiment
for the .name TLD, which has about 460, 000 records. We see that
ECC generally has a much smaller memory footprint than RSA.
NSEC5 also takes up more space than plain NSEC3 because: (i)
NSEC5PROOFs are precomputed and cached to optimize perfor-
mance (Section 5.4), and (ii) NSEC5 records use 256-bit hash values,
while NSEC3 uses (outdated, less secure) 160-bit SHA1 hash values.
Finally, the memory overhead for NSEC3White Lies is tiny, because
NSEC3 records are computed on the fly at query time.
7.3 Recursive resolver performance.
NSEC3 and NSEC5 both require recursive resolvers to perform
public-key crypto verifications (Table 3). We therefore find that
query processing times at the recursive resolver for our RSA- and
ECC-based NSEC5 implementations are comparable to those of
NSEC3.
Overall per-query processing time. Figure 8-(left) reports the
overall query processing time per NXDOMAIN response, as ob-
served by a stub resolver. This measurement includes the process-
ing time both at the recursive resolver (which verifies DNSSEC
responses) and at the authoritative nameserver (with serves or gen-
erates responses). We set up the stub resolver, recursive resolver,
and nameserver on our single machine. Our query load was 100,000
sequential unique queries, each eliciting an NXDOMAIN response
from the nameserver.
Figure 8-(left) shows that plain NSEC3, NSEC3 White Lies, and
NSEC5 all have processing times of the same order of magnitude.
This follows because they all require public-key crypto verifica-
tions at the recursive resolver. (Compare this to processing time at
the authoritative nameserver alone, which is orders of magnitude
faster for plain NSEC3). Overall processing time for plain NSEC3 is
fastest (about 1ms); again, this follows because plain NSEC3 does
not require online crypto at the nameserver. Of the three configu-
rations that use online crypto at the nameserver to prevent zone
enumeration, RSA-based NSEC5 takes the longest (3.4ms on av-
erage), followed by NSEC5-ECC (3.1ms on average) and NSEC3
White Lies using PowerDNS (2.4ms on average).
Mixed traffic. The average query processing time is likely to be
faster in practice, since real DNSSEC traffic contains positive re-
sponses (e.g., signed A records) as well as NXDOMAIN responses.
To highlight this, Figure 8-(center) shows the overall query process-
ing time for ECC-based NSEC5, when handling traffic containing
both positive and NXDOMAIN responses. Positive queries were
sampled from the zone according to a Zipf distribution, which
has been shown to be a good fit for DNS query distributions [57].
Naturally, NSEC5 only affects performance for negative queries;
everything else is validated from cache in minimal time.
Validation time. Finally, we zoom in on performance at the recur-
sive resolver by considering only the time required for validating
responses. (This excludes processing at the nameserver, latency to
the nameserver, packet processing at the recursive, etc.).
Figure 6-(right) shows that cryptographic validation NSEC5-RSA
is faster than NSEC5-ECC. (This is natural: RSA verification is well
known to be faster than ECDSA verification.)
Next, consider the two plain NSEC3 configurations. Figure 6-
(center) shows that most queries are validated in microseconds;
meanwhile, the top 11% of queries (on the right side of the figure)
take seconds to validate. The reasoning for this subtle. Because we
issue 100,000 queries for a zone that only has 1000 names, our recur-
sive resolver eventually collects all the NSEC3 records for the zone.
(In other words, it enumerates the zone.) Once this happens, the
authoritative nameserver begins sending NSEC3 records that the
recursive resolver has already cached. Instead of cryptographically
validating these NSEC3 records from scratch, the resolver simply
takes a few microseconds to retrieve the cached NSEC3 record.
Thus, the excellent validation performance of plain NSEC3 follows
because we make a large number of queries to the same small zone.
In a live system that queries multiple zones, this behavior is likely
to be less significant.
Now consider the validation performance for NSEC3 White Lies.
With White Lies, a fresh NSEC3 record is generated for every query,
so the recursive will never be able to collect all the NSEC3 records
for the zone. (That is, will never be able to enumerate the zone
unless it queries specifically for all names in it!) Thus, this excellent
validation performance we observed for plain NSEC3 is not possible
with NSEC3 White Lies. Analogous reasoning shows it is also not
possible with any other approach that prevents zone enumeration,
including NSEC5.
Thus, it is most sensible to compare NSEC5’s validation per-
formance to that of NSEC3 White Lies. Figure 8-(right) shows
that validation for NSEC3 White-Lies (0.5ms) is faster than for
11
Making NSEC5 Practical for DNSSEC
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 0  20  40  60  80  100
tim
e 
(m
s)
% of queries
NSEC3-RSA2048
NSEC3-ECDSAp256
NSEC5-RSA2048
NSEC5-ECDSAp256
PowerDNS-WhiteLies-ECDSAp256
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Resolved
 from cache
Resolved with
 trip to authoritative
tim
e 
(m
s)
% of queries
 0% NXDOMAIN
 10% NXDOMAIN
 20% NXDOMAIN
 30% NXDOMAIN
 40% NXDOMAIN
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 0  20  40  60  80  100
tim
e 
(m
s)
% of queries
NSEC3-RSA2048
NSEC3-ECDSAp256
NSEC5-RSA2048
NSEC5-ECDSAp256
PowerDNS-WhiteLies-ECDSAp256
Figure 8: Overall query processing time at the recursive resolver and authoritative nameserver (left) per NXDOMAIN response
across all configurations, and (center) for ECC-based NSEC5 under mixed (positive & NXDOMAIN) traffic. (right) Validation
time per NXDOMAIN response at the recursive resolver for all configurations.
NSEC5-ECC implementation (1.2ms). Digging into this result, we
found that it is due to (1) parsing and logging the different parts
of the NSEC5 response (e.g., the NSEC5PROOF), (2) fetching the
NSEC5KEY, and (3) a performance gap between our (unoptimized)
ECC-based VRF verification and the highly-optimized OpenSSL
verification of ECDSA.
Remark: Speedups with Ed25519? Finally, we note that our
NSEC5 implementation uses the NIST P-256 elliptic curve. However,
the literature suggests that computational speedups are possible by
moving from P-256 to the Ed25519 [77] elliptic curve. We leave this
to future work.
8 NSEC5 VS. RECENT INNOVATIONS
We consider the relationship between NSEC5 and some recent DNS
innovations.
Aggressive negative caching (draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse) [42]:
A new proposal, that is in the process of being standardized, calls
for aggressive caching of NSEC* records at resolvers. The idea is
to reuse cached NSEC* records to answer queries that are different
from the original query that elicited the NSEC* record. (The origi-
nal DNSSEC specifications [21] do not allow this.) To see how this
works, suppose the zone in Figure 3 used (plain) NSEC and sup-
pose we sent a type A query for foo.example.com. The response
would contain an NSEC record that (1) attests that no names exist
between bar.example.com and www.example.com, and (2) has a
type bitmap with the type A bit set and type AAAA, NS, MX, etc.
bits cleared. Then, aggressive negative caching allows resolvers to
use the cached NSEC record to infer that:
(1) Other names covered by the NSEC record do not exist in the
zone (NXDOMAIN for e.g., qqq.example.com).
(2) Other types matching the NSEC record do not exist in the
zone (NODATA for bar.example.com for types e.g., AAAA,
NS, MX).
This first item treats offline zone enumeration as feature, rather than
a bug. In other words, it exploits the fact that resolvers can make
offline inferences about the names covered by an NSEC/NSEC3
record. It optimizes DNSSEC performance by cutting down on
the number of queries sent from resolver to nameserver. (For in-
stance, the fast response validation behavior we observed for plain
NSEC3 in Figure 8-(right) would also translate to a reduce number
of queries.) However, this performance optimization is obviated
by any scheme that prevents offline zone enumeration, including
NSEC3 White Lies and NSEC5, because these schemes necessarily
prevent resolvers from making offline inferences about the names
present or absent in the zone. Meanwhile, the second item optimizes
performance (reducing queries from resolver to nameserver) for all
the schemes including NSEC5.
RFC8020 [32]. RFC8020 is a new standard that states that NXDO-
MAIN for a query (c.example.com) implies that names deeper in
the DNS hierarchy (e.g., b.c.example.com) also do not exist. This
allows resolvers to cache theNXDOMAIN response for c.example.com
and reuse it to answer a later query for e.g., b.c.example.com. All
the NSEC* variants we have considered thus far, including NSEC5,
can benefit from this performance optimization.
Black Lies (draft-valsorda-dnsop-black-lies [79]). There is a
(concurrent) NSEC* proposal that leverages the fact that NODATA
responses are short. Black Lies is an online-signing solution that
answers each negative query with an NODATA response, even if
the “correct” response is NXDOMAIN. (Hence, the Black Lie.) For
example, suppose the zone in Figure 3 receives an AAAA query for
a.example.com. The Black Lies response is a single NSEC record
matching a.example.com, with its AAAA type bit cleared, that is
generated and signed on the fly. To prevent zone enumeration, the
second name in the NSEC record is the immediate lexicographic
successor of query, i.e., \000.a.example.com. Responses are short
because only one NSEC record is required.
Black Lies comes with some caveats. Most importantly, it is an
online-signing solution (per Tables 1,2) that requires the nameserver
to know the secret zone-signing key (ZSK). Thus, it fails to provide
strong integrity. Moreover, because Black Lies gives a NODATA
response when the “correct” response is NXDOMAIN, it obviates
the performance optimization of RFC8020 [32]. Also, Black Lies
thwarts any diagnostic or security tool (e.g., [38, 74]) that uses
NXDOMAIN responses to infer that a name definitely does not
exist in the zone.
9 THE TRANSITION TO NSEC5
How can today’s DNSSEC transition to NSEC5?
The DNS community has faced this problem before. First, the
NSEC3 specification [60] came out after the earliest deployments of
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DNSSEC [68], and so resolvers and nameservers had to transition
from NSEC to NSEC3 [60, Section 10.4]. Second, there is currently a
proposal to transition from RSA to ECDSA signatures over the NIST
P-256 elliptic curve [81]. Third, a desire to avoid NIST-specified
curves [30] and to have short DNSSEC responses, is motivating
the community to consider transitioning to digital signatures over
Edwards elliptic curves [77, 88]. Fourth, there is also the DPRIVE
initiative that seeks to add confidentiality to DNS transactions, to
mitigate concerns surrounding pervasive network monitoring [3].
Given that other transitions may be on the horizon, this might also
be a good time to consider transitioning to NSEC5.
9.1 The mechanics of the transition.
We believe that the transition to NSEC5 can be accomplished simi-
larly to the transition to NSEC3. DNSSEC records have an algorithm
number that specifies the cryptographic algorithms they use (e.g.,
5 specifies RSA signatures with SHA1 hashing [9]). To transition
to NSEC3, two new algorithm numbers were introduced—6:DSA-
NSEC3-SHA1 and 7:RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1. (Once the transition
period ended, subsequent DNSSEC algorithm numbers (8,10, 12,
etc.) implied support of NSEC3.) Per [21, Sec 5.2], resolvers that did
not support NSEC3 ignored DNSSEC records with algorithms 6 or
7, and either ‘hard failed’ (i.e., rejected the response) or ‘soft failed’
(i.e., accepted the response) depending on their local policies. Algo-
rithm numbers could also be used to transition to NSEC5. There
are two ways [58, Sec 4.1.4] to transition from an old algorithm
number to a new one.
1. Conservative approach. The nameserver simultaneously sup-
ports both algorithms. Thus, the nameserver answers each query
with a DNSSEC response has records for both the old and the
new algorithm number. The resolver can validate the response if
recognizes at least one algorithm. The downside is that DNSSEC
responses contain twice as many keys and signatures.
2. Liberal approach. The nameserver stops serving responses
with the old algorithm, and uses the new algorithm instead. The
downside is that resolvers that do not support the new algorithm
number will treat the zone as unsigned [21, Sec 5.2]. Thus, the
liberal approach is unlikely to be used until many resolvers support
the new algorithm number.
There are several reasons why the liberal approach seems right
for NSEC5. First, it does not blow up the length of DNSSEC re-
sponses. Secondly, and more importantly, a zone that simultane-
ously supports both NSEC3 and NSEC5 will not reap the security
benefits of NSEC5. If (plain) NSEC3 is supported in parallel with
NSEC5, then offline zone enumeration is possible by collecting the
NSEC3 records.9 If online signing (e.g., NSEC3 White Lies) is sup-
ported in parallel with NSEC5, then the nameserver must hold the
secret ZSK key, and thus NSEC5 loses its strong integrity guaran-
tees. On the other hand, the liberal approach is unlikely to be used
in a transition until a majority of resolvers support NSEC5. How-
ever, given that resolvers might soon be upgraded to add support
for Edwards curves, now might also be a good time to consider
adding support for NSEC5.
9This also suggests that algorithm negotiation [51] may be less helpful in a transition
to NSEC5—a zone-enumeration attacker can simply negotiate to speak NSEC3.
10 CONCLUSION: WHY USE NSEC5?
The zones that could adopt NSEC5 are the ones that currently con-
sider deploying NSEC3 White online signing because zone enumer-
ation is an issue for them. NSEC5 provides comparable/improved
performance without compromising integrity (even when the name-
server is compromised). Meanwhile, with NSEC3 White Lies, com-
promising the nameserver compromises the integrity of the zone
(Table 2).
[48] proved that providing integritywhile preventing offline zone
enumeration necessarily require the nameserver to perform one on-
line public-key crypto computation for each negative query. While
this seems expensive, we demonstrate that our ECC-based NSEC5
nameserver implementation can be viable even for high-throughput
scenarios. In Section 7.2 we found that it supports a throughput
of 64, 000 negative queries per second (qps) on a moderately-sized
server with 24 threads on 40 virtual cores. This is about 2x the
throughput of the only implementation of RFC-compliant online
signing that is widely deployed and publicly available (PowerDNS’s
implementation of NSEC3 White Lies). A throughput of 64 Kqps
should be well above the needs of most zone operators—even public
statistics from the A-root operator [6] indicate an average nega-
tive query load about one order of magnitude smaller per server.
Without access to proprietary statistics regarding corporate second-
level-domains, it is not easy to estimate their throughput require-
ments. Nevertheless, this 64 Kqps throughput is achieved even with
purely negative traffic (rather that mixed traffic, with both positive
and negative queries) and a single server (rather than a cluster of
nameservers, a more common deployment configuration).
With ECC-based NSEC5, the overall processing time for an nega-
tive query (from stub resolver, to recursive resolver, to authoritative
nameserver) is only 30% longer that of online signing with NSEC3
White Lies (using the PowerDNS implementation). It may be possi-
ble to reduce this performance gap with an optimized implementa-
tion, since the nature and number of cryptographic operations in
the two configurations is similar. Moreover, our implementation is
for the NIST P-256 elliptic curve; further speedups might be possi-
ble by moving to the Ed25519 curve [77]. (Doing this requires no
modifications to ECC-based VRF of Figure 2.)
Thus, we believe that NSEC5 can be a practical solution for
zones that care about protecting sensitive information (names of
hosts, servers, routers, IoT devices, DANE certificates [54], etc.)
from offline zone enumeration attacks. Meanwhile, operators that
don’t care about zone enumeration should just use plain NSEC3.
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A HASHING ONTO THE CURVE.
The ECC-based VRF (Figure 2) uses a hash function H1 that maps
arbitrary-length strings to points on an elliptic curve. How can we
instantiate such a hash function? Ideally we want an instantiation
that works for both curves we have considered: NIST P-256 and
Ed25519.
One lightweight technique was proposed in [31]. It proceeds as
follows. Assume an elliptic curve with equation y2 = x3 + ax + b
and order qf . Given an input α (the queried name in our case), set
counter i = 0 and compute h = H (α | |i ), where H is a standard
cryptographic hash function, e.g., SHA-256, and | | is concatenation.
Then, if h3 + ax + b is a quadratic residue (that is, h is the valid
x-coordinate of a point on the curve) output the point (h, (h3 +
ax +b)1/2) raised to the power of cofactor f . Otherwise, increment
the counter by 1 and try again. This simple process is expected to
terminate after two steps, and the involved operations are very fast,
with an expected running time of (O log3 (n)), if the curve is defined
over finite fieldGF (n). The range of this function is only half of the
group G (because only one y is chosen for a random x), but that
does not materially change the proofs of security. (Specifically, in
Claims B.4 and B.5, the running time for simulating queries to H1
doubles).
As first shown in [33], the above technique is not suitable when α
must be kept secret; this is because the running time of the hashing
algorithm depends on α , and so it is susceptible to timing attacks.
However, this attack is not relevant for NSEC5, because the only
value hashed in the query phase is the query α itself, which is
already known to the adversary.
B SECURITY OF ECC-BASED VRF.
We define the necessary security properties that a VRF needs to
satisfy in order to be used in our application, and provide formal
proofs that they are satisfied by ECC-based VRF from Figure 2.
B.0.1 Proof sketches. We start with a sketch of the proofs of
three properties: uniqueness, psuedorandomness, and collision re-
sistance.We define and prove them formally after this brief informal
sketch. For this purposes of this sketch, assume E = G and therefore
f = 1.
Uniqueness. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose an adversary,
given the secret key x , can come up with some α and an incorrect
VRF output value β1 , H2 ([H1 (α )]x ) for that α , and a valid proof
π1 = (γ1, s1, c1) for value β1. The verification function for the VRF
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computes h = H1 (α ) and
u = (дx )c1дs1
v = (γ1)
c1hs1
Now take the logarithm of the first equation base д and the log-
arithm of the second equation base h, subtract the two resulting
equations, and express c1, to get
c1 ≡
logд u − logh v
x − logh γ1
(mod q) . (3)
Now since γ1 , hx (since β1 is not the correct output value), the
denominator is not zero, and there is exactly one c1 modulo q that
satisfies equation (4) for a given (д,h,дx ,γ ,u,v ), regardless of s .
However, recall that the verifier checks that c1 is equal to the output
of the cryptographic hash function H3 on input (д,h,дx ,γ ,u,v ).
SinceH3 is a randomoracle, its output is random, and the probability
that it equals the unique value determined by its inputs according
to (3) is negligible.10 Thus, we have arrived at our contradiction.
Pseudorandomness. This follows from the DDH assumption, in
the random oraclemodel. Roughly speaking, the pseudorandomness
adversary does not know the secret VRF key x , but must distinguish
between between pairs (α , β ) where β is the VRF hash output on
input α , and pairs (α , r ) where r is a random value. This adversary
knows the public valuesд andдx , and can easily computeh = H1 (α )
for any α . However, by the DDH assumption,hx looks random even
given (д,дx ,h), and so H2 (hx ) is pseudorandom in the range of H2.
Collision resistance. For a collision to happen, H2 (hx1 ) should
equal to H2 (hx2 ) where h1 = H1 (α1) and h2 = H1 (α2) for some
α1 , α2. Assume H2 is a τ -to-1 function. Since raising to the power
x is a permutation, for every h1, there are at most τ possible h2
values that can cause a collision. Since h1 and h2 are obtained via
random oracle queries, a pair that causes a collision is unlikely to
be found after QH queries to H1, as long asG is larger than τQ2H /2.
B.0.2 Full Proofs. We now expand on the sketches above to
prove that the construction in Section 4.3 is a secure VRF. It suffices
to prove three properties: Trusted Uniqueness (see [66, Definition
10]), Selective Pseudorandomness (see [66, Definition 11]), and
Collision-Resistance (not formally discussed in [66], but mentioned
in the proof of Theorem 4). Sufficiency of these three properties
for constructing NSEC5 follows from [66, Theorem 4]. We discuss
each property in turn.
We model the hash functions H1 and H3 as random oracles. We
use notation VerPK (α , β,π ) to denote the verification algorithm,
which outputs 1 if and only if the proof π and hash output β are
valid for input α and public key PK .
B.0.3 Uniqueness. Recall that uniqueness requires that there
should be only one provable VRF output β for every input α ; trusted
uniqueness limits this requirement to only the case when the public
key is valid.
Following tradition of the VRF literature, Naor and Ziv [66, Defi-
nition 10]) define uniqueness unconditionally: that is, for a validly
generated public key, each input α to the VRF has at most one hash
10The birthday paradox does not apply here, so that for a 128-bit security level is
suffices to have c be 128 bits long.
output β that can be proven to be correct. However, the construc-
tion in Section 4.3 satisfies it only computationally: more than one
hash output y may exist, but only one valid β—the one produced
by FSK (α )—can be proven correct by any computationally bounded
adversary, even given the secret key. We are not aware of any prior
work defining this relaxation of the uniqueness property, although
Chase and Lysyanskaya [34] mention that such a relaxation can be
defined. We therefore define it here. Our definition is in terms of
concrete, rather than asymptotic security, because concrete security
enables us to set length parameters.
Definition B.1. (Computational Trusted Uniqueness.) A VRF sat-
isfies (QH , ϵ )-trusted uniqueness if for all adversaries A that make
at most QH queries to the random oracle, for a validly chosen key
pair (PK, SK ), the probability that the adversary can come up with
an incorrect output β1 , FSK (α ) and a proof for this β1 is less than
ϵ : namely,
Pr[A(PK, SK ) → (α , β1,π1) s.t.
β1 , FSK (α ) and VerPK (α , β1,π1) = 1] ≤ ϵ .
We now prove that the VRF satisfies Definition B.1 based on the
randomness of the oracle H3. (Note: this proof does not rest on any
computational assumptions or on programming a random oracle.)
Claim B.2. The VRF satisfies (t , ϵ )-computational trusted unique-
ness of Definition B.1 for ϵ = (QH + 1)/min(q/2, ρ), where ρ =
|range(H3) | and QH ≤ t is the number of queries the adversary
makes to the random oracle H3.
Note that the quantitative bound on ϵ in the above claim implies
that the bit length log ρ of the output c of H3 can be equal to the
desired security parameter; in particular, it can be shorter than the
prime order q of the group G (whose bit length needs to be at least
twice the security parameter in order to protect against attacks on
the discrete log). This claim is the only part of the security analysis
affected by the output length of H3 (and thus the bit length of the
integer c from the VRF proof π ).
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A that violates computa-
tional trusted uniqueness with probability ϵ . That is, on input д,x ,
the adversary A makes QH queries to the H3 oracle and wins by
outputting (α , β1,π1) s.t. β1 , FSK (α ) and Ver(α , β1,π1) = 1 with
probability ϵ . We will show that ϵ ≤ (QH + 1)/min(q/2, ρ), where
q is the order of the group G and ρ = |range(H3) |.
The proof π1 contains γ1 such that β1 = H2 (γ
f
1 ). Note that the
correct β = FSK (α ) is computed as H2 (γ f ) for γ = [H1 (α )]x . Since
β1 , β , we have γ
f
1 , γ
f , i.e., γ f1 , h
xf , where h = H1 (α ).
Now, it must be that π1 = (γ1, c, s ) for some c, s that ensure that
Ver(α , β1,π1) = 1. The verification function Ver ensures that γ1 ∈ E
and computes h = H1 (α ) and
u = дsPKc
v = hsγ c1 .
Because the VRF parameters and public keys are trusted, it follows
that that д ∈ G and PK = дx ∈ G. The range of H1 is G − {1} so
h ∈ G. Since G ⊂ E, all variables in the above two equations are
guaranteed to be in E.
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For any a ∈ E, we define aˆ = af . By the structure theorem
for finite abelian groups, E has exactly one subgroup of order q,
because q does not divide f . This subgroup isG = {b ∈ E | bq = 1}.
Therefore, aˆ ∈ G, because aˆq = af q = a |E | = 1 (by Fermat’s little
theorem).
We can now raise both equations to the power of the cofactor f
to obtain similar equations, but with all the variables in G:
uˆ = дˆs ˆPKc
vˆ = hˆsγˆ c1 .
Note that h , 1 (since the range of H1 is G − {1}). Because G is
of prime order, h is also a generator of G. Since q does not divide
f , hˆ = hf , 1 and thus hˆ is also a generator of G. Same for дˆ.
Therefore we can take the logarithm of the first equation base дˆ
and the logarithm of the second equation base hˆ, . Solving these for
s we get
logдˆ uˆ − cx ≡ s (mod q)
loghˆ vˆ − c loghˆ γˆ1 ≡ s (mod q)
which implies that
c ≡
logдˆ uˆ − loghˆ vˆ
x − loghˆ γˆ1
(mod q) (4)
Since γˆ1 , hˆx , the denominator is not zero, and so there is only one
c modulo q that satisfies equation (4) given д,дx ,h,γ1,u, and v .
Recall that for verification to pass,
c = H3 (д,h,д
x ,γ1,u,v ) .
Note that the contents of the query to H3 contains every value in
the right hand side of equation (4), and thus the correct c is uniquely
defined at the time the query is made (assuming G is fixed).
What is the probability, for a given query to H3, that the ran-
dom value returned by the H3 oracle is congruent to that correct c
modulo q? Let ρ denote |range(H3) |. If the range of H3 is a subset
of {0, . . . ,q − 1}, then this probability is either 1/ρ or 0, depending
on whether the correct c is in range(H3). Else (i.e., if q < ρ), think
of reducing every element in range(H3) modulo q. Then some val-
ues c modulo q will be hit ⌊ρ/q⌋ times, while others will be hit
⌈ρ/q⌉ times. Thus, the probability that any given c is hit is at most
⌈ρ/q⌉/ρ ≤ ((ρ/q) + 1)/ρ = 1/q + 1/ρ < 2/q.
Assume the adversary outputs β1,π1 and then the verification
algorithm is run. This causes a total of QH + 1 queries to H3 (QH
by A and one by the verifier), so by the union bound, the chances
that any of them returns a correct c for that query are at most
(QH + 1)/min(q/2, ρ). □
Remark. Our computational trusted uniqueness property is slightly
weaker than the unconditional trusted uniqueness of Naor and Ziv’s
[66, Definition 10]. Thus, the proof that NSEC5, when constructed
from the VRF of Figure 2, satisfies the soundness property in [66,
Theorem 4] needs a slight change, as follows. The proof in [66]
is a reduction from an adversary A who violates soundness to an
adversary B who forges signatures. The reduction relies on the
fact that Amust provide the correct β value (called y in [66]) and
proof π for the VRF as part of its soundness-violating output on an
input α (called x in [66]). Computational trusted soundness ensures
that this happens except with negligible (i.e., (QH +1)/min(q/2, ρ))
probability. Thus, the success probability of the reduction reduces
from ϵ to ϵ − (QH + 1)/min(q/2, ρ).
Uniqueness without trusting the key. Our VRF can be modi-
fied to attain the stronger property of computational uniqueness
(without needing to trust the key generation). There are three cases:
• If the group E is fixed and trusted to have been correctly gener-
ated (i.e., E is known to have a subgroup of prime order q), and
the generator д is known to be in G − {1}, then the verifier just
needs to check that PK ∈ E. (This is the only requirement on PK
is the proof above.)
• If the group E is fixed and trusted, but д and PK are not, then the
verifier needs to check that д ∈ E, дf , 1, as well as that PK ∈ E.
• If the group E is not fixed, then we need to include an unam-
biguous identifier of E as input to H3 (so that a malicious prover
cannot choose E after seeing c), and verifier needs to also check
that G is a subgroup of E of order q, q is prime, |E | = qf , q
does not divide f , д ∈ E, дf , 1, and PK ∈ E. The identifier of E
must also be unambiguous in the sense that the adversary should
not be allowed to choose the mapping from the group E to its
identifier after seeing c .
B.0.4 Pseudorandomness. We will state and prove pseudoran-
domness in terms of concrete, rather than asymptotic, security. This
allows us to set parameters and work with fixed groups G,E.
We require a slight modification to the notions of pseudoran-
domness and selective pseudorandomness from [66, Definition 11]:
instead of being indistinguishable from a random bit string, the out-
put of our VRF is indistinguishable from a truncation of a random
element of G − {1}, i.e., from the distribution H2 (UG ), where UG
is the uniform distribution on G − {1}. Our definitions are thus as
follows.
Definition B.3. (Pseudorandomness) AVRF satisfies (t ,QH ,QP , ϵ )
pseudorandomness for output distribution S if no adversary D
(which can depend on the fixed VRF parameters, such asG,E, etc.)
whose running time and description size are bounded by t , whose
total number of random oracle queries is bounded by QH and to-
tal number of Π and F queries is bounded by QP , can distinguish
the following two games with advantage more than ϵ . In the both
games, VRF keys (PK , SK ) are honestly generated, and D (PK ) gets
to query ΠSK , FSK , and the random oracles on arbitrary inputs. In
both games, D chooses a challenge input α∗ that has been queried
to neither Π nor F . In one game, D receives FSK (α∗), while in the
other D receives a random element drawn from S . Finally, after
additional queries to ΠSK and FSK (except on α∗), D outputs one
bit indicating which game D thinks it is playing.
The slightly weaker notion of selective pseudorandomness is
defined the same way, exceptD has to choose α∗ before any queries
and before seeing PK .
Pseudorandomness of our VRF depends on the following assump-
tion about the groupG and generator д, known as the (t , ϵ )-DDH
(Decisional Diffie-Hellman) Assumption: for any adversary C whose
description size and running time are bounded by t , the difference
in probabilities (where the probabilities are over a random choice
17
Making NSEC5 Practical for DNSSEC
of h,h′ ∈ G − {1} and x ∈ {1, . . . ,q}) that C (дx ,h,hx ) = 1 and
C (дx ,h,h′) = 1 is at most ϵ . (Because the assumption is specifically
for the group G, we think of the fixed VRF parameters G,q,E, f ,
and д as hardwired into the adversary C .)
We now prove that our VRF satisfies both pseudorandomness and
selective pseudorandomness. We address selective pseudorandom-
ness first, because it is simpler. Our proof relies on programming
the random oracles H1 and H3.
Claim B.4. Under the (t , ϵ )-DDH assumption, for anyQH ,QP , the
VRF satisfies (t ′,QH ,QP , ϵ ′) selective pseudorandomness for output
distribution H2 (UG ), for t ′ ≈ t (minus the time for Θ(QH + QP )
exponentiations inG and one evaluation ofH2) and ϵ ′ = ϵ +QP (QP +
QH )/q.
Proof. We need to show the following: if
• D chooses α∗,
• then receives an honestly generated PK = дx and
– either H2 ([H1 (α∗)]xf )
– or H2 applied to a random element of G − {1},
• is allowed QH queries to random functions H1 and H3 and QP
queries are to ΠSK or FSK (except on α∗)
• can distinguish between the two cases with advantage ϵ ′
then we can build C that breaks (t , ϵ )-DDH assumption for t ≈
t ′ (plus the time for Θ(QH + QP ) exponentiations in G and one
evaluation of H2) and ϵ = ϵ ′ −QP (QP +QH )/q.
Because FSK is computable, in our case, fromΠSK , we can assume
without loss of generality that D never queries FSK—every query
to FSK can be replaced with a query to ΠSK .
Given (дx ,h,h′) (where h′ is either hx or a random element of
G − {1}), C gets α∗ from D, sets the VRF public key PK as дx and
runs D with public key PK and input H2 (h′f ). Note that if h′ is a
random element of G − {1}, then so is h′f , because raising to the
power f is a permutation ofG−{1}, since q does not divide f . Thus,
D is getting either the correct VRF output or H2 (UG ), as required
by Definition B.3.
C answers the queries of D as follows:
• If D queries α∗ to random oracle H1, C returns h.
• If D queries any other αi to H1, C chooses a random ρi ∈
{1, . . . ,q} and then programs random oracle H1 as
H1 (αi ) := дρi .
(Note: this response is distributed uniformly in G − {1}, just like
with the honest H1, because д is a generator of G.)
• If D queriesH3,C return a fresh random value in the appropriate
range. (Note that these responses are distributed just like honest
H3).
• If D makes a query qi to Π |SK (note that qi , α ),
– C makes a query to H1 (qi ) as described above to get ρi ,
– C sets γ = (дx )ρi where дx was the public key given as input
to D,
– C chooses random values s ∈ [q] and c ∈ range(H3) and then
computes
u = дs (дx )c
and
v = [дρi ]s [(дx )ρi ]c .
(Note that u,v,x ,h = дρi , s , and c are distributed identically
to the distribution produced by Π. The difference in how these
distributions are obtained is simply that Π chooses a uniform
k while C chooses a uniform s , where k and s are tied by
the equation s + cx ≡ k (mod q), and u = дk , v = hk .) If
H3 (д,дρi ,дx , (дx )ρi ,u,v ) is already defined, then C fails and
aborts. Else, C programs the random oracle H3 to let
H3 (д,д
ρi ,дx , (дx )ρi ,u,v ) := c
(Note: if C does not abort, then H3 is uniformly random, just
like honest H2 and H3).
If C does not abort, then its simulation for D is faithful and
C can just output what D outputs. The probability that C aborts
is simply the probability that H3 (д,дρi ,дx , (дx )ρi ,u,v ) is already
defined during the computation of the response to Π; since at most
QH +QP values ofH3 are defined, andu is a uniformly random value
inG (because s is uniformly random in [q] and д is a generator), the
chances that a single query to Π causes an abort are (QH +QP )/q,
and the chances that any of the queries to Π causes an abort are
QP (QH +QP )/q. Thus, the advantage of C is at least ϵ ′ −QP (QP +
QH )/q. □
We can also prove pseudorandomness, but with a looser security
reduction than selective pseudorandomness.
Claim B.5. Under the (t , ϵ )-DDH assumption, for anyQH ≥ 1,QP ,
the VRF satisfies (t ′,QH ,QP , ϵ ′) pseudorandomness for output distri-
butionH2 (UG ), for t ′ ≈ t (minus the time forΘ(QH+QP ) exponentia-
tions inG and one evaluation ofH2) and ϵ ′ = 4ϵQP+QP (QP+QH )/q.
Proof. We explain the proof by showing the differences from
the previous proof. The problem is that C does not know what α∗
is—it could be in any of the H1 queries. We follow the approach of
[36] to deal with this problem.
Whenever D makes a query αi to H1, C flips a biased coin to
decide whether this query is going to be “type-sig” (with probability
QP/(QP + 1)) or “type-attack” (with probability 1/(QP + 1)). If the
query is “type-sig,” then C works the same way as in the proof
of Claim B.4. Else, C returns hρi for a random ρi ∈ {1, . . . ,q}. C
remembers the type of the query and the ρi value.
If D makes a query qi to Π, then C aborts if qi = αi for an
αi of type-attack (else C proceeds as before). At some point D
produces α∗; before proceeding, C makes sure α∗ has been queried
to H1 (performing the query if it hasn’t been). C aborts if α∗ = αi
for some αi of type-sig, and otherwise returns H2 (h′ρi f ) as the
response to the challenge.
We note that all the responses to H1 queries are still uniformly
distributed over G − {1} and independent, because both д and h
are generators of G. If h′ = hx , then D receives the correct value
for FSK (α∗), namely H2 (h′ρi f ) = H2 (hxρi f ) = H2 ([H1 (α∗)]xf ).
On the other hand, if h′ is a uniform element of G − {1}, then
instead of instead of FSK (α∗),D receives a uniform response chosen
independently of anything else from from H2 (G − {1}), because a
uniform value inG − {1} raised to f (a fixed power not divisible by
q) is uniform in G − {1}.
NowC succeeds as long as (1) there is no abort due to a collision
ofH3 inputs as in the proof of Claim B.4) and (2) the guesses for the
H1 query type (type-sig or type-attack) don’t lead to an abort. Note
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that these guesses are independent of the view of D and therefore
of the success of D. The probability that the guesses are correct for
each Π query and for α∗ is(
QP
QP + 1
)QP 1
QP + 1
≥ 14QP
whenever QP ≥ 1. (The bound is obtained by observing that the
left-hand multiplied by QP is increasing for qsiд ≥ 1, and its value
at QP = 1 is 1/4.) We thus obtain the claimed result. □
B.0.5 Collision Resistance. We now define trusted collision re-
sistance, which states that an adversary cannot produce a collision
even given SK , as long as the keys are honestly generated. This
property, while not explicitly defined in [66], is necessary to ensure
the completeness of NSEC5, i.e., to ensure that a valid non-existence
proof can always be generated by the nameserver and accepted by
the resolver whenever the record does not exist (see [66, Proof of
Theorem 4]).
Definition B.6. (Trusted Collision Resistance) A VRF satisfies
(QH , ϵ ) trusted collision resistance if no adversary making QH
random oracle queries, can, given an honestly generated SK , output
two values α1 , α2 such that FSK (α1) = FSK (α2) with probability
greater than ϵ .
Claim B.7. If every output of H2 has at most τ preimages in G,
then our VRF satisfies (QH ,τQ2H /(2q))-trusted collision resistance.
Note that in our suggested instantiation of H2, τ = 2, so we have
(QH , (QH + 2)2/q)-trusted collision resistance
Proof. Let α1,α2 be the output of the adversary. Without loss
of generality, assume α1 and α2 have been queried to H1; if not,
add those queries to the code of the adversary, for a total of QH + 2
queries.
Given two values α i , α j , what is the probability (for a random
choice of the oracle H1) that FSK (α i ) = FSK (α j )? Such a collision
happens if [H1 (α i )]xf takes on one of the τ values that collide with
[H1 (α j )]xf after the application of H2. Since H1 (α i ) is uniform in
G − {1}, and raising to x f is a permutation of G − {1}, the chances
of hitting one of those τ values is τ/(q − 1). Applying the union
bound over at most (QH + 2) (QH + 1)/2 pairs of distinct queries
to H1, we get that a successful output α1,α2 exists among queries
to H1 with probability at most τ (QH + 2) (QH + 1)/(2q − 2) <
τ (QH + 2)2/(2q) (assuming the latter fraction is less than 1 — but
the theorem statement is trivially true otherwise). □
Collision resistance without trusting the key. Similarly to the
case with uniqueness, our VRF can be modified the same way to
attain collision resistance without needing to trust the key genera-
tion. The modifications are the same as in the case of uniqueness
(to ensure that FSK is uniquely defined), with the additional check
that PK f , 1 to ensure that x is not divisible by q.
C SECURITY OF RSA-BASED VRF
In [48] the authors provided an explicit proof only for the selec-
tive pseudorandomness of the RSA-based VRF in Figure 1 (see [48,
Lemma III.2]), but not for its trusted uniqueness or for its collision
resistance. These proofs are straightforward, but we provide them
for completeness.
Claim C.1. The RSA-based VRF of [48] satisfies trusted uniqueness
as per [66, Definition 10]).
Proof. The claim that for every α there exist β,π such that
VerPK (α , β ,π ) = 1 follows by inspection since for every α it is true
that VerPK (α , ProveSK (α )) = 1.
Let A be an adversary such that A(PK, SK ) → (α , β1,π1) and
ProveSK (α ) → (β2,π2) and β1 , β2, where (PK, SK ) ← Setup(1κ ).
Since β1 , β2 it follows that π1 , π2 as βi = H (πi ) for i = 1, 2
and H (·) implements a deterministic function. For the same reason,
the value of MGF (α ) is fully determined by α . Since PK , SK are
valid RSA keys, the function f (x ) = xe is a bijection in ZN (where
e is the RSA public exponent) and therefore πe1 , MGF (α ) = π
e
2 .
Due to this, the probability that VerPK will accept for proof π1 and
value β1 for input α is 0. □
Claim C.2. The RSA-based VRF of [48] for H with output size
ℓ (assuming ℓ is less than the length of the RSA modulus) satisfies
(QH ,Q
2
H /2
ℓ+1)-trusted collision resistance per definition B.6.
Proof. Indeed, for a collision to occur, eitherH (π1) should equal
H (π2) for some π1 , π2, or MGF (α1) should equal MGF (α2) for
α1 , α2. (Because trusted key generation ensures that raising to
the power d is a permutation.) Let Q ′H be the number of queries to
H and Q ′′H be the number of queries to MGF . Let k be the output
size of theMGF . The probability of collision, by the union bound, is
at most Q ′2H /(2 · 2ℓ ) +Q ′′2H /(2 · 2k ) ≤ Q2H /2ℓ+1 because k ≤ ℓ. □
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